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Understanding	fiscal	politics	in	times	of	austerity:	tax
linkages	in	Britain	and	France
Why	do	national	fiscal	pathways	diverge	in	times	of	austerity?	Since	the	late	1970s,	most	of	the
OECD	countries	have	either	responded	to	such	episodes	by	cutting	spending	and	keeping	taxes	low,
or	by	increasing	taxes	to	match	growing	public	spending.	The	UK	and	France	are	two	striking
examples	of	this	divergence.	Zbigniew	Truchlewski	explains	how	tax	linkages	can	account	for	these
opposing	approaches.
Since	the	onset	of	the	age	of	fiscal	austerity	in	the	mid-1970s,	national	fiscal	pathways	–	the	proportion	of	taxation
and	public	spending	to	GDP	–	have	diverged	among	OECD	countries.	Some	have	increased	both	their	spending	and
tax	levels,	while	others	sought	to	limit	their	increase.
The	United	Kingdom	and	France	are	epitomes	of	these	divergent	fiscal	pathways.	British	governments	have
increased	taxes	only	marginally	in	the	past	four	decades,	thus	remaining	in	the	OECD	average,	but	have	changed
the	distribution	of	their	burden	in	significant	ways.	In	the	UK,	Labour	could	only	win	elections	when	it	promised	not	to
increase	taxes,	and	converged	with	the	Conservatives	in	terms	of	economic	policies	in	the	mid-1990s.	French
governments,	on	the	other	hand,	gradually	increased	the	tax	burden	to	one	of	the	highest	in	the	world.	In	France,	the
Right	converged	with	the	Left	in	terms	of	tax	policies,	mostly	increasing	social	security	contributions	or	seeking
alternatives	to	this	option.
In	my	research,	I	argue	that	this	puzzling	divergence	is	due	to	domestic	“tax	linkages”,	i.e.	how	dominant	forms	of
taxation	shape	state-society	relationships	and	partisan	competition.	Tax	linkages	have	three	main	characteristics:
their	nature,	their	governance	structure,	and	the	dilemmas	they	create.	Using	these	three	characteristics	I	propose	a
new	typology	of	fiscal	politics	during	austerity.
First,	the	nature	of	tax	linkages	creates	expectations	depending	on	whether	they	are	earmarked	(like	social
contributions)	or	not	(often	time	the	case	of	income	taxes).	Earmarked	taxes	generate	expectations	on	return	on
investment	and	thus	constrain	governments	regarding	spending	cuts,	making	tax	increases	more	likely.	By	contrast,
if	taxes	are	not	earmarked,	they	generate	uncertainty:	voters	resist	tax	increases	and	thus	governments	find	it	easier
to	cut	spending.
Second,	tax	linkages	are	embedded	in	different	governance	structures	which	imply	different	distributions	of	power.
They	can	be	governed	either	centrally	–	tax	revenues	are	gathered	into	one	fund	over	which	the	Treasury	has	power
–	or	they	can	be	governed	in	a	decentralized	manner	–	for	instance,	trade	unions	have	veto	power	over	taxes	paid	in
special	funds.
Third,	tax	linkages	create	dilemmas	in	the	long	run.	Increasing	strong	tax	linkages	like	social	contributions	leads	to
high	labour	costs	that	undermine	national	competitiveness	and	produce	unemployment.	In	this	French	scenario,	the
Left	is	trapped	in	a	serious	fiscal	dilemma,	exacerbated	by	issues	of	fairness:	workers	bear	the	brunt	of	taxation,
while	pensioners	benefit	from	higher	social	expenditure.	Conversely,	governments	can	also	be	trapped	in	weak	tax
linkages.	These	constrain	redistribution	in	times	where	fighting	inequality	is	paramount	to	preclude	the	rise	of
populism.	As	a	result,	governments	find	new	ways	to	redistribute	income	by	resorting	to	tax	credits	(as	in	the	UK).
The	concept	of	tax	linkages	yields	a	new	typology	of	austerity	politics	with	at	least	two	ideal	types	epitomized	by
Britain	and	France.
The	British	case
In	Britain,	OECD	data	suggests	that	between	1963	and	2015,	levels	of	taxation	hovered	around	33%	of	GDP	with	a
standard	deviation	of	1.65%	of	GDP.	British	revenues	are	structured	in	a	way	that	suggests	weak	tax	linkages.
Income	tax	dominates	heavily,	representing	40%	of	revenue,	indirect	taxation	of	goods	at	35%,	and	social
contributions	averaging	17%	between	1965	and	2015.	Additionally,	the	UK	governance	of	tax	linkages	has	been
increasingly	centralised	in	the	Treasury.	British	tax	linkages	were	strong	after	WWII,	with	National	Insurance
Contributions	introduced	in	1911,	and	these	were	supposed	to	be	strengthened	according	to	the	Beveridge	Report
(1942).
British Politics and Policy at LSE: Understanding fiscal politics in times of austerity: tax linkages in Britain and France Page 1 of 3
	
	
Date originally posted: 2018-07-02
Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/tax-linkages-in-britain-and-france/
Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/
However,	in	1948,	additional	means-tested	benefits	were	established	and	in	the	1950s	the	Treasury	cut	contributions
to	the	National	Insurance	Fund	–	thus	replacing	the	actuarial	logic	of	the	system	with	pay-as-you-go.	Since	then,	NIC
and	income	tax	have	converged	in	terms	of	rates,	while	the	Treasury	took	over	the	management	of	both	in	the
2000s.	The	reason	for	this	centralization	and	marginalization	of	strong	tax	linkages	is	that	the	Treasury	prefers	to
manage	public	expenditure	flexibly	by	avoiding	strong	tax	linkages.	Additionally,	since	the	late	1970s,	a	coalition	of
experts,	business	organisations,	and	academics	is	pushing	for	a	merger	of	the	National	Insurance	Contributions	and
income	tax,	further	weakening	the	tax	linkage.	If	this	has	not	happened	so	far,	it	is	mainly	because	the	Treasury
estimates	that	the	administrative	costs	of	such	a	complex	reform	outweigh	its	benefits.
Finally,	the	alternation	of	short	majorities	after	1945	resulted	not	only	in	weak	but	also	inconsistent	tax	linkages	that
rendered	the	tax	system	incoherent,	inflexible,	and	unstable,	compounding	its	weak	revenue-generating	capacity.	As
a	result,	weak	tax	linkages	governed	by	a	strong	Treasury	implies	that	the	Right	has	an	advantage	in	cutting
spending	and	keeping	the	tax	burden	constant	as	a	proportion	of	GDP.	Therefore,	weak	tax	linkages	advantage	the
Right,	while	the	Left	has	an	incentive	to	carry	out	“pre-emptive”	strikes	to	appear	credible	and	capture	the	median
voter.
The	French	case
Contrast	this	with	the	French	fiscal	profile	where	the	tax	burden	is	among	the	three	highest	in	the	OECD	(53%	of
GDP)	and	public	spending	tops	the	club	(over	50%	of	GDP).	French	tax	linkages	are	dominated	by	social	security
contributions	(varying	between	35	and	45%	of	tax	revenues	since	1963),	with	a	small	share	of	income	tax	(between
15	and	20%	before	the	early	1990s	and	then	between	20%	and	25%).	French	tax	linkages	also	rely	on	indirect
taxation	on	consumption.	In	countries	like	France	strong	tax	linkages	that	are	co-governed	with	social	partners
means	that	the	left	has	an	advantage	in	protecting	social	spending	and	that	the	right	will	have	a	hard	time	cutting
such	spending	unless	it	strikes	a	bargain	with	veto	players.
Given	that	austerity	happens	in	times	of	recession	and	high	unemployment,	this	country	responds	with	tax	and
spending	increases.	Again,	this	type	of	responsiveness	may	be	prone	to	a	self-reinforcing	logic.	But	here,	left-wing
parties	have	a	strategic	advantage	over	right-wing	parties:	it	is	more	difficult	for	the	latter	to	cut	spending	and	the
right	converges	on	the	left	in	matters	of	austerity.
The	dynamics	of	French	tax	linkages	suggest	that	while	contributory	taxes	increased	substantially	from	1978	to	1991,
they	negatively	impacted	French	competitiveness	and	unemployment.	This	resulted	in	a	three-decade-long	battle	on
“social	charges”	between	trade-unions,	business	organisations,	and	the	government,	which	leads	to	the	question	of
the	governance	of	tax	linkages:	while	income	and	indirect	taxes	are	governed	by	the	State,	social	contributions	are
co-governed	with	trade	unions	with	the	involvement	of	parliament	since	1995.	Although	the	State	pilots	social
security	finances,	the	governance	architecture	of	the	French	welfare	state	means	there	is	a	different	structure	of
political	competition	during	austerity	than	in	the	UK.
This	new	taxonomy	of	austerity	politics	based	on	tax	linkages	offers	a	simple	way	to	grasp	the	complex	politics	of
fiscal	adjustment	over	long	periods	of	time,	and	offers	important	insights	into	how	partisan	competition	is	shaped	by
underlying	tax	linkages	in	hard	times.
_____________
Note:	the	above	draws	on	the	author’s	published	work	in	Party	Politics.
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